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As a result of our nation’s progress in breaking down de jure and de 
facto discrimination, there is significant debate about how to advocate for 
racial justice.  Since explicit prejudice is in such stark decline,1 some argue 
that the fight for racial equality is almost complete.  All that remains is for 
the achievements of stigmatized racial groups to catch up to our nation’s 
enlightened hearts and minds. 
However, as Professor Angela Onwuachi-Willig demonstrates in her 
important and groundbreaking new book, According to Our Hearts: 
Rhinelander v. Rhinelander and the Law of the Multiracial Family, it is a 
mistake to believe that the fight for racial justice is over.  Through her close 
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examination of relationships between black and white individuals, she 
exposes how the remnants of our nation’s sordid history of racial bias 
continue to affect both law and culture today.  More importantly, what 
Onwuachi-Willig conveys is the need to challenge dominant assumptions 
regarding how racism operates in order to improve the laws and customs 
that enable equitable outcomes.  Specifically, she demonstrates that 
although de jure prohibitions on interracial marriages are unconstitutional 
after the Supreme Court’s decision in Loving v. Virginia2 and societal 
approval towards these couplings is higher than ever,3 the dearth of mixed-
race relationships and families, especially black–white couples,4 belies the 
claim that our society has overcome the deeply engrained taboo. 
Despite progress, outright racism against mixed-race couples is 
troublingly evident, as the violent discourse in response to a recent Cheerios 
commercial5 and the violent assaults and murders perpetrated against such 
couples attest.6  However, Onwuachi-Willig’s chief accomplishment in this 
book is not simply pointing out where racism still exists but rather in 
revealing why our thinking about race must evolve in order to address it.  
As Onwuachi-Willig masterfully demonstrates, unconscious and invisible 
biases are equally, if not more, pernicious than outright bigotry because 
their invisibility in both law and society makes them difficult to recognize, 
confront, and address.7  In fact, the law often provides no remedy for even 
the most obvious instances of discrimination against mixed-race couples.8 
According to Our Hearts is on the pulse of the central paradox facing 
the fight for civil rights today, namely, how to reconcile the broad gentling 
of racial animus with the continued persistence of racial inequalities of all 
types.  Onwuachi-Willig gives us some insight into this puzzle as it relates 
to multiracial families.  Through her exploration of how law and society 
together create and maintain the normative ideal of family as monoracial 
and heterosexual she “challenge[s] the commonly accepted notion that legal 
 
2. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
3. ANGELA ONWUACHI-WILLIG, ACCORDING TO OUR HEARTS: RHINELANDER V. 
RHINELANDER AND THE LAW OF THE MULTIRACIAL FAMILY 166 (2013). 
4. Id. at 124–26, 128–31.  Professor Onwuachi-Willig primarily focuses her attention on 
heterosexual relationships. 
5. Colleen Curry, Interracial Family in Cheerios Ad Gets Hate Comments, ABC NEWS 
BLOGS (May 31, 2013, 1:08 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2013/05/interracial-
family-in-cheerios-ad-gets-hate-comments. 
6. See, e.g., Smokey D. Fontaine, Interracial Couple Murder Was a Hate Crime, NEWSONE 
FOR BLACK AM. (Nov. 7, 2008), http://www.newsone.com/33081/interracial-couple-murder-was-
a-hate-crime (detailing a crime committed against interracial couple); Sasha King, 3 Men Charged 
with Hate Crime After Beating Up Interracial Couple, BLACK ENTERPRISE (Feb. 4, 2013), 
http://www.blackenterprise.com/news/interracial-hate-crime-men-charged (same). 
7. See ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 3, at 134–36, 154–55 (discussing and critiquing the 
assumption that attraction is personal and not affected by societal norms). 
8. See, e.g., id. at 207–08, 262–63 (describing courts’ rejection of discrimination claims 
premised on interraciality). 
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discouragement of and punishment for intimate, cross-racial heterosexual 
intimacy no longer exists.”9  After persuasively demonstrating that these 
sanctions survive today, she introduces the concept of “interraciality.”  This 
term refers to the discrimination biracial, heterosexual couples face 
“because of their interraciality as a couple, as opposed to the race of just 
one member of the couple.”10  In order to facilitate recognition of and 
recompense for the harm multiracial families continue to endure, 
Onwuachi-Willig argues that discrimination based on interraciality should 
be included as a protected category in current antidiscrimination law.11 
In this Review, we argue that her concept of interraciality is not only 
an important intervention for a group currently left unprotected by 
antidiscrimination law but that it is also important within the broader 
context of civil rights.  Her insights not only explain why adding protected 
categories to antidiscrimination law is necessary, but—when combined 
with lessons from the social psychology of contemporary bias—they show 
why the law should also account for the additional mechanisms through 
which racial bias manifests itself, whether conscious or unconscious, visible 
or invisible.  
In Part I, we briefly summarize the book, emphasizing Professor 
Onwuachi-Willig’s discussion of how societal attitudes influence the law’s 
construction of the family as monoracial and heterosexual and the resulting 
harms to multiracial families.  In Part II, we situate her book within the 
broader cause of civil rights and explain how her concept of interraciality 
pushes the boundaries of the law’s traditional framing of bias as primarily 
motivated by intentional racism.  We briefly introduce the social science of 
contemporary bias to demonstrate that not only is the law constructed 
around an outdated notion of family but also that the law’s current 
conception of racial bias is similarly constructed to make invisible all but 
the most obvious and purposeful forms of discrimination.  We conclude by 
arguing that only by enlarging our discussion of the nature and causes of 
bias, as Onwuachi-Willig does so powerfully in her book, can law and 
society address “the full range of [discrimination] harms that can occur.”12 
I. Interraciality: Protecting an Invisible Class 
While today no laws prohibiting interracial marriages exist and 
attitudes towards these relationships are generally positive, our society is 
still dealing with the effects of centuries of legal and de facto discrimination 
against these couples.  This is reflected not only in the relative rarity of 
 
9. Id. at 201. 
10. Id. at 21 (footnote omitted). 
11. Id. at 264Ȃ66. 
12. Id. at 212. 
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black–white intimacy13 but also in the invisible, but harmful, ways that law 
and society continue to treat these relationships as nonnormative.  Professor 
Onwuachi-Willig’s theory of interraciality accounts for this legacy of 
history by suggesting that antidiscrimination laws should explicitly 
recognize multiracial families as a new protected class.  Only by doing so, 
she argues, can the law, and society in general, begin to ameliorate the often 
invisible punishments these couples and families confront.  This Part traces 
Onwuachi-Willig’s illuminating discussion of the historical and 
contemporary punishments of heterosexual, mixed-race couples and 
unpacks her theory of interraciality. 
A. The Rhinelanders’ Doomed Relationship 
Onwuachi-Willig uses the ill-fated relationship of Alice and Leonard 
Rhinelander in 1920s New York to expose how the legal and social taboo 
against interracial relationships is not simply a relic of the past but 
continues to affect multiracial relationships today.  In part I of the book, she 
examines their relationship from their initial meeting in 1921, through their 
two-month marriage, to the end of the annulment trial in which Leonard lost 
his claim of marital fraud.14  His allegation was that Alice had deceived him 
about her racial identity, and had he known she was not white, he would not 
have married her.15  Through her analysis, Onwuachi-Willig reveals “how 
law and society have often functioned together to frame the normative ideal 
of family as monoracial, both in our history and in our present.”16 
The Rhinelander story reflects the symbiotic relationship between 
societal norms and the law.  Despite the absence of de jure prohibitions on 
interracial marriages in 1920s New York,17 racism made the crossing of 
racial boundaries in intimate relationships unacceptable.  The depth of the 
then-existing racial intolerance is made starkly apparent by the fact that 
neither Alice’s lawyers nor the judge questioned whether racial 
misrepresentation was a cognizable claim under the marriage fraud 
statute.18  It was so obvious that unknowingly marrying a black person was 
harmful and degrading to the white spouse that neither the judge nor Alice’s 
lawyer challenged the underlying racist assumption embedded in the very 
nature of the lawsuit itself.  The language of the statute did not require this 
interpretation, but prevailing attitudes about black inferiority did. 
Furthermore, existing beliefs about “racial purity” also foreclosed 
Alice’s ability to defend against the lawsuit by claiming a white racial 
 
13. Id. at 124–26. 
14. Id. at 19–20. 
15. Id. at 33. 
16. Id. at 121. 
17. Id. at 36. 
18. Id. 
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identity.  Although Alice’s mother was white and the rule of hypodescent 
did not officially apply in New York, it was also apparent that just one drop 
of “black” blood was sufficient to exclude her from being classified as 
white.19  Finally, Alice’s lawyer took advantage of and reinforced the 
predominant view of race as biological.  He argued that no fraud occurred 
because Leonard had seen Alice naked prior to their marriage and thus had 
to know that she was black.20  To prove his point, in a shocking and 
degrading move that would have been unthinkable had Alice been 
considered white, her lawyer had Alice bare her upper and lower body in 
front of the all-male jury.21  This display was necessary, in his view, to 
demonstrate that she was “‘dark’ all over.”22 
Although racial attitudes have become more outwardly tolerant since 
the Rhinelander trial in 1924, in the remainder of the book, Professor 
Onwuachi-Willig reminds the reader that it is not so easy to escape the 
legacy of the racist history reflected in the Rhinelander case.  She 
masterfully weaves the story throughout, persuasively demonstrating that its 
lessons still have relevance today.  Next, subpart I(B) shows that despite the 
gentling of racial animus, multiracial families are still punished, both 
explicitly and implicitly, for crossing the color line. 
B. Current Manifestations 
In part II of the book, Onwuachi-Willig challenges the belief that 
“legal discouragement of and punishment for . . . [interracial] intimacy no 
longer exists.”23  She demonstrates that while the law does not explicitly 
discriminate against these relationships, its implicit assumptions about the 
monoraciality of families are equally pernicious.  That is because, by 
framing family as monoracial, antidiscrimination law fails to recognize 
multiracial families and the unique harms they suffer as a result of their 
interraciality.24 
One example she uses to illustrate her point comes from how the Fair 
Housing Act defines familial status.25  This statute provides a compelling 
illustration because, unlike the other civil rights statutes, its goal is to 
safeguard families, instead of just individuals, from unlawful discrimi-
 
19. Id.  For a general discussion of hypodescent, see Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Undoing Race? 
Reconciling Multiracial Identity with the Pursuit of Racial Equality, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 6–7) (on file with authors). 
20. ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 3, at 77. 
21. Id. at 77–79. 
22. Id. at 79 (quoting RENEE C. ROMANO, RACE MIXING: BLACK-WHITE MARRIAGE IN 
POSTWAR AMERICA 167 (2003)). 
23. Id. at 201. 
24. See id. at 20. 
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(k) (2006) (defining “familial status” only in terms of one’s relation 
to his or her dependents, not on the relationship between spouses). 
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nation.26  However, since Congress assumed monoraciality when drafting 
the statute, its text inadvertently excludes multiracial families from 
protection.  Thus, if a landlord unlawfully refuses to rent to a monoracial 
black family, the family unit can file a suit together, alleging discrimination 
against them as a family.27  However, the statute does not explicitly cover 
situations where “the couple is being discriminated against, not because of 
the race of a specific member or specific members of the family—that is, 
the black person in the family—but rather because of the family’s status as 
a multiracial family, as a unit that was formed through race mixing.”28  
Multiracial families are not a protected category under the statute,29 and the 
fact that these families were overlooked in the statute’s drafting 
demonstrates just how deeply embedded the norm of the monoracial family 
is. 
A few courts have attempted to work around the invisibility of 
multiracial families in the law by using a “discrimination by association” 
analysis.30  When seeking relief under the Fair Housing Act, for instance, 
this analysis requires each member of a multiracial family to claim 
“separately and individually that, but for the race of their spouse, they each 
would have been treated differently.”31  Unlike monoracial couples, who 
can file their claims together, the discrimination by association analysis 
requires multiracial families to “engage in wordplay” and “divide up their 
family unit” in order to bring their suit.32 
This construction of family as monoracial does not just exist in 
antidiscrimination law; it exists in society as well.  For instance, Onwuachi-
Willig gives numerous examples of multiracial relationships being rendered 
invisible in public “even when all the social cues point to marriage or 
commitment.”33  The monoracial ideal is so strong that people simply do 
not see the relationship.34  Worse yet, even the children of these couples are 
often perceived as not being part of the family unit.35  The situation is not 
 
26. ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 3, at 194. 
27. See id. at 197. 
28. Id. at 196. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 197–98. 
31. Id. at 197. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 175. 
34. See id. at 175–78 (discussing this phenomenon and describing it as “relationship 
erasing”). 
35. See id. at 179–84 (providing examples of instances in which parents of biracial children 
are questioned about their position as a parent).  The number of multiracial children in the United 
States has grown exponentially since the 1970s.  See Lucas, supra note 19 (manuscript at 10–11) 
(reporting that the number of people who reported multiracial status on the census grew from 
forty-six thousand in 1970 to almost one million in 1980 and that by 2000 that number had 
reached 6.8 million, although this was also the first year that people were instructed to check two 
racial categories on the census form if applicable). 
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improved when the family becomes visible because then these couples or 
families are interrogated about their relationship36 or their children,37 as 
their interracial coupling is perceived as the most salient aspect of their 
relationship.  Thus, society’s normative conception of family as monoracial 
and heterosexual renders multiracial families at once both invisible and 
remarkable.38  These contrasting treatments coexist because these families 
exist outside the norm. 
Some may dismiss “all the slights, mistreatments, and intrusions 
toward multiracial families [as] purely social,”39 reminiscent of the 
Supreme Court’s sharp distinction between social and legal discrimination 
in the now infamous Plessy v. Ferguson40 decision.41  The Court’s analysis 
in Plessy reflected the belief of many sociologists that “stateways cannot 
change folkways,”42 and Justice Powell’s later opinion in Wygant v. 
Jackson Board of Education43 expressed the view that de facto social 
discrimination was “too amorphous” to be addressed by antidiscrimination 
law.44  However, as Onwuachi-Willig explains, “These responses ignore the 
way that law can work and has worked to perpetuate and reify norms and 
practices that continue to place interracial families on the margins of our 
society.”45  Thus, the law and social norms together establish and maintain 
the monoracial ideal, exposing multiracial families not only to social stigma 
but also to legal erasure. 
The problem, as Onwuachi-Willig demonstrates, is that while the 
discrimination by association analysis gives these families a vehicle to 
recover damages and other forms of recompense, it does not capture the 
“true nature of discrimination against the mixed-race, heterosexual 
couple . . . .  Specifically, [the discrimination] is based on interraciality and 
the particular stereotypes targeted at people who together intimately cross 
 
36. See ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 3, at 169 (describing how interracial couples are often 
asked questions such as “How did you ever meet?”); see also id. at 175–79 (providing other 
examples of questions multiracial couples have received about their relationship). 
37. Id. at 170, 179–83. 
38. And when it becomes apparent that the group is actually a unit, then, she writes, “In that 
moment, the questioner gets to exercise her privilege in discerning and naming who is family and 
who is not.”  Id. at 176. 
39. Id. at 184. 
40. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
41. See id. at 544 (“The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute 
equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of things it could not have been intended 
to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political 
equality . . . .”). 
42. E.g., Barton J. Bernstein, Plessy v. Ferguson: Conservative Sociological Jurisprudence, 
48 J. NEGRO HIST. 196, 201 (1963). 
43. 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
44. Id. at 276 (plurality opinion). 
45. ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 3, at 184. 
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racial boundaries.”46  Thus, the law “fails to address the ‘expressive harms’ 
or lack of dignity in the continued assumption of monoraciality among 
families in housing discrimination statutes.”47 
Throughout the book, Onwuachi-Willig carefully examines how all the 
civil rights statutes suffer from similar shortcomings.  By rendering the 
multiracial family invisible, antidiscrimination law not only constructs and 
reinforces the normative ideal of the monoracial family but also fails to 
recognize the unique discrimination faced by multiracial families unless 
they force themselves into the monoracial ideal.  Thus, antidiscrimination 
law reifies existing racial categories. 
C. The Remedy 
Onwuachi-Willig suggests that to solve the problem of “law’s invisible 
role in reifying race and racial hierarchies among individuals and 
families,”48 Congress should add the term “interraciality” as a protected 
category to antidiscrimination statutes.49  She argues that this “modest”50 
change could have a number of important effects.  First, it would provide 
much-needed redress for the unique harms multiracial families face and 
signal to advocates that they should recognize and raise these claims.51  
Furthermore, it would help to weaken society’s conception of fixed racial 
categories, thereby creating a place for these families within society.52  
Finally, she concludes that: 
[A]dding the term interraciality to antidiscrimination statutes would 
make visible the ways in which narrowly framing the ideal for 
families has stifled us in our growth as individuals and communities, 
and it would help to expose all the differences in the lives and lived 
experiences of families . . . .   
 In the end, as the assumptions that have undergirded our social 
norms and laws slowly begin to catch up to our nation’s aspirations 
for equality, the text within our antidiscrimination laws should also 
begin to reflect those very goals.53 
 
46. Id. at 197. 
47. Id. at 198. 
48. Id. at 233. 
49. Id. at 234. 
50. Id. at 233. 
51. Id. at 264. 
52. Id. at 265–66. 
53. Id. at 266.  There are, of course, many reasons to be skeptical that Congress or the courts 
would be sympathetic to such a change in antidiscrimination law.  See Jeb Rubenfeld, Essay, The 
Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141, 1143 (2002) (“[A] good deal of the present 
Supreme Court’s groundbreaking constitutional case law makes better sense when viewed not in 
the doctrinal terms in which it presents itself, but in terms of an anti-antidiscrimination 
agenda . . . .”); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (2011) 
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In the next Part, we situate Onwuachi-Willig’s book within the larger 
struggle for civil rights and racial equity in the United States.  We argue 
that her insights pave the way for recognition of all the ways in which the 
law fails to remedy discrimination, even beyond the domain of family. 
II. From Interraciality to Racial Realism 
Onwuachi-Willig’s close examination of multiracial families 
demonstrates the symbiotic relationship between the law and prevailing 
norms.  On the one hand, the law embeds societal norms, such as the norm 
of the monoracial family.  However, societal norms do not remain static.  
As societal norms change, the law also changes to incorporate new 
understandings.  On the other hand, the law does not simply reflect societal 
norms, it also can play a role in legitimizing them.  Thus, once the 
problematic assumptions embedded in the law are brought to light, the law 
must change to reflect new understandings.  Otherwise, the law will 
continue to play a role in legitimizing the problematic norm. 
Onwuachi-Willig demonstrates this relationship in the context of the 
interracial family, showing that current antidiscrimination law reflects 
societal expectations of monoraciality among families.  Yet, as these 
multiracial families have become more numerous, the assumption of 
monoraciality has slowly begun to change, bringing the embedded 
assumption to light and making it clear that the law is no longer adequate to 
reach all the harms it was meant to redress.  Some judges are beginning to 
recognize that antidiscrimination law is inadequate to safeguard multiracial 
families and have devised innovative interpretations of the law to bring 
these families under its protection.54 
However, while these broader interpretations are commendable, 
working within existing laws rather than changing the law also has 
problematic consequences.  As Onwuachi-Willig points out, leaving the 
framework in place legitimizes and reinforces the monoracial norm by 
requiring multiracial families to erase their multiracial status in order to fit 
themselves within the monoracial ideal.55  Only by changing the law to 
provide explicit recognition of and protection to multiracial families will 
the law begin to facilitate changes in the way that society views family.  
Thus, the law influences norms, and norms influence the law.  Furthermore, 
while some judges have recognized the discrimination that multiracial 
families endure, others have not.  Now that the problematic norm has been 
 
(“[T]he [Supreme] Court has systematically denied constitutional protection to new groups, 
curtailed it for already covered groups, and limited Congress’s capacity to protect groups through 
civil rights legislation.” (footnotes omitted)). 
54. See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text. 
55. See ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 3, at 198.  See generally, Lucas, supra note 19 
(highlighting this problem in her discussion of multiracial individuals and antisubordination). 
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exposed, the protection these families receive should not be dependent upon 
the judge who happens to hear the case. 
In this Part, we argue that Onwuachi-Willig’s insights about the 
symbiotic relationship between law and society are not only important in 
the domain of interracial families but also in the broader cause of civil 
rights.  This is because the antidiscrimination statutes upon which she relies 
also embed societal assumptions about how discrimination operates.  As a 
result, they not only fail to remedy discrimination against interracial 
families, but they also fail to remedy all but the most invidious and 
intentional forms of discrimination. 
In the short term, then, the addition of multiracial families as a 
protected class is important because currently they are unprotected against 
even intentional discrimination.  Adding them to the statutes will give them 
the same recognition and protection that other protected classes already 
receive.  However, these already existing protected classes only receive a 
remedy when they can provide evidence of malicious motives.56  Thus, as 
we argue next, in addition to adding protected categories, antidiscrimination 
law must expand to cover less obvious, but more ubiquitous, contemporary 
mechanisms of bias as well.  Otherwise, multiracial families, just like the 
protected classes that already exist, will not obtain a remedy for the more 
prevalent forms of bias that exist today.  In subpart II(A), we discuss how 
antidiscrimination law currently frames discrimination.  In subpart II(B), we 
introduce the social science of contemporary bias to highlight the 
disconnect between the law’s construction of discrimination and how 
discrimination actually operates. 
A. The Law’s Construction of Discrimination 
Currently, antidiscrimination law foregrounds intent and malicious 
motivations.  This construction of discrimination is understandable when 
we consider the societal context in which the civil rights statutes were 
enacted.  These statutes were passed in the 1960s57 to provide remedies for 
the malign effects of centuries of intentional bigotry, including slavery and 
Jim Crow laws and policies.58  Unsurprisingly, then, they reflect the 
 
56. By malicious motives we mean that plaintiffs must show a discriminatory intent, even 
when the claim is based upon disparate impact.  See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239Ȃ41 
(1976) (holding that laws that have a racially discriminatory effect, but that were not adopted to 
advance discriminatory motives, are constitutional); see also Bernie D. Jones, Critical Race 
Theory: New Strategies for Civil Rights in the New Millennium?, 18 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 
14Ȃ15 (2002) (“With respect to disparate impact determinations, plaintiffs gained relief only if 
they could show that an allegedly discriminatory policy had discrimination as its intent.”). 
57. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-284, §§ 801–819, 82 Stat. 81, 81–89; Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437; Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 
Stat. 241. 
58. See Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Century 
Race Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1923, 1991Ȃ96 (2000) (describing the fall of Jim Crow laws from 
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understanding of bias as primarily intentional and motivational.  Hence, just 
as antidiscrimination law reflects society’s framing of family as monoracial, 
so too does it reflect society’s understanding of how discrimination 
manifests itself. 
For instance, the employment discrimination statute, Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibits discrimination based upon disparate 
treatment.59  Courts typically “approach every disparate treatment case as a 
search for discriminatory motive or intent.”60  While this interpretation of 
the statute is not inevitable,61 it reflects the common understanding of bias 
as arising primarily from consciously held negative attitudes and beliefs.  
As Professor Angela Harris has noted, this focus on intent grows out of the 
“essentially moralistic discourse of discrimination [that] condemns the 
racialist ideologies that pervaded most of twentieth century law and public 
policy, . . . [and] place[s] a premium on proving individual intent to harm 
and distinguishing innocent victims from evil victimizers.”62 
However, while the foregrounding of intent and motive made sense at 
a time when most forms of discrimination were overt and obvious, today 
discrimination no longer primarily functions this way.63  Consequently, the 
 
the end of World War II through the 1960s and the statutes passed to remedy the effects of those 
laws). 
59. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 985–86 (1988) (citing to 
Title VII for a disparate treatment theory).  While Title VII and the other civil rights statutes also 
prohibit disparate impact discrimination, id. at 990, over 90% of the cases brought under Title VII 
focus on disparate treatment.  Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A 
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. 
REV. 1161, 1163 (1995).  For a discussion of the almost insurmountable hurdles posed by the 
disparate impact prong of the civil rights statutes, see Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 589–92 
(2009).  See also Sheila R. Foster, Causation in Antidiscrimination Law: Beyond Intent Versus 
Impact, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1469, 1478 n.25 (2005) (“Since its decision in Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Court has yet to find disparate impact discrimination, and lower 
federal courts have not had much better success.”); Krieger, supra, at 1162 n.3 (noting that an 
American Bar Foundation study found that “disparate impact cases comprised only 1.84% of all 
employment-related civil rights cases in the federal court docket between 1985 and 1987”). 
60. Krieger, supra note 59, at 1164–65. 
61. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) (“Title VII 
tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise.”); Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 
TUL. L. REV. 1065, 1084–85 (1998) (“The term discriminatory intent is hardly self-defining, as its 
meaning can range anywhere from unconscious bias to conscious bias to conscious desire to 
harm.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: 
The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 288 (1997) (“[I]t is not the Court’s 
doctrine that has limited its vision, but the Court’s vision has limited its doctrine.”); Rebecca 
Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?: Discrimination in Multi-Actor 
Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495, 499 (2001) (“[T]he disparate treatment 
inquiry should focus on causation, not conscious discrimination.”). 
62. Harris, supra note 58, at 2003. 
63. See Dovidio, supra note 1, at 845 (“[A]lthough overt expressions of prejudice have 
declined steadily and significantly over time, subtle—often unconscious and unintentional—forms 
continue to exist.”); see also Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1493Ȃ
94 (2005) (“[M]ost of us have implicit biases in the form of negative beliefs (stereotypes) and 
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traditional civil rights model does not describe either the experiences of 
those often targeted for disparate treatment or our best scientific 
understanding of the mechanisms that undergird discrimination.  As a 
result, the law’s blind spot has harmful and unintended effects similar to 
those identified by Onwuachi-Willig in her book.  Next, we briefly discuss 
what social psychology reveals about the operation of bias. 
B. The Mind–Science–Justice Model of Discrimination 
In stark contrast to the traditional civil rights model of discrimination, 
which relies on lay assumptions of discrimination’s origins, the mind–
science–justice (MSJ) model64 of discrimination adopts a behavioral–realist 
approach to questions of race and fairness in the law.65  This behavioral–
realist approach uses scientific consensus in the social sciences to develop 
accurate models of human behavior from which legal doctrine may then be 
derived.66  It calls upon legislators, jurists, and legal scholars to identify 
empirically verifiable mechanisms for the causes of objectionable 
inequalities and to account for them in law and policy.67 
When behavioral realism is applied specifically to domains of race and 
antidiscrimination legislation, the science reveals a radically different 
theory of how discrimination occurs and what remedies it.  Specifically, 
while bigotry can play a role in intergroup injuries (e.g., employment 
discrimination, police abuses, educational inequalities), the science reveals 
that attitudes are a notoriously capricious predictor of behaviors—
accounting for 10% of behaviors at best.68  This suggests that the traditional 
 
attitudes (prejudice) against racial minorities. . . .  [T]hese implicit biases have real-world 
consequences . . . .”); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in 
Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 
1004 (2006) (“[M]any scholars have drawn on advances in the empirical social sciences to 
demonstrate that what the law refers to as intentional discrimination can just as easily result from 
the uncontrolled application of implicit, unconscious, or automatic stereotypes . . . as from the 
operation of conscious discriminatory designs.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
64. This term was first used in Phillip Atiba Goff et al., (The Need for) A Model of 
Translational Mind Science Justice Research, 153 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. (forthcoming 2014). 
65. See id. (manuscript at 9–11, 15–16) (stressing the need for a model, such as the MSJ 
model, that attempts to ground theoretical abstractions in real word experiences); see also Krieger 
& Fiske, supra note 63, at 1000–01 (describing the behavioral–realist approach as requiring 
judges to develop substantial theories without basing their analysis on inaccurate concepts of real 
world phenomena). 
66. See Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research: Implications 
for Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1119, 1120–21 (2006) 
(discussing how behavioral realism seeks to bring in more complete models of human behavior 
derived from the social sciences to help guide the business of lawyering). 
67. See id. (identifying the provision of “more complete, empirically satisfying foundations” 
to models of legal behavior as a goal of behavioral realism). 
68. See generally Dovidio, supra note 1 (illustrating the shifting focus from overt prejudice 
studied in first half of the twentieth century to the more subtle forms of prejudice that are currently 
being studied); Richard T. LaPiere, Attitudes vs. Actions, 13 SOC. FORCES 230 (1934) (illustrating 
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civil rights model, which presupposes that racial prejudice is nearly the sole 
source of discriminatory outcomes, builds from a faulty conception of 
discrimination.  Further, the traditional model is not able to account for 
research innovations, particularly in the mind sciences, over the past quarter 
century such as the ways that implicit bias,69 color blindness,70 stereotype 
threat,71 and masculinity threat72 can conspire to produce racially disparate 
outcomes even in the absence of old-fashioned racial bigotry. 
For instance, research demonstrates that as a result of a psychological 
process known as stereotype threat, even egalitarian individuals can engage 
in behaviors that create problematic racial disparities and sometimes 
produce deadly consequences.73  Stereotype threat refers to the fear and 
anxiety that is produced when one fears being evaluated in relationship to a 
negative stereotype about one’s group.74  The influence of stereotype threat 
on interracial interactions has been well documented.75 
 
the difference between attitudes and overt behavior in a study comparing whether hotels and 
restaurants would serve individuals of Chinese descent with the results of a questionnaire sent to 
the same establishments asking whether they would serve Chinese individuals); Allan W. Wicker, 
Attitudes Versus Actions: The Relationship of Verbal and Overt Behavioral Responses to Attitude 
Objects, J. SOC. ISSUES, Autumn 1969, at 41, 65 (examining various aspects of the relationship 
between attitudes and actions and finding that “[o]nly rarely can as much as 10% of the variance 
in overt behavioral measures be accounted for by attitudinal data”). 
69. See John F. Dovidio et al., Implicit and Explicit Prejudice and Interracial Interaction, 82 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 62, 66 (2002) (finding that the implicit attitudes of white 
individuals toward black individuals predicted the white individuals’ spontaneous behavior). 
70. See Victoria C. Plaut et al., Is Multiculturalism or Color Blindness Better for Minorities?, 
20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 444, 444Ȃ45 (2009) (concluding that color blindness, “an assimilationist 
ideology . . . [that] stresses ignoring or minimizing group differences,” can “reinforce[] majority 
dominance and minority marginalization” and “may promote interpersonal and institutional 
discrimination through social distancing”). 
71. See Phillip Atiba Goff et al., The Space Between Us: Stereotype Threat and Distance in 
Interracial Contexts, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 91, 91, 104 (2008) (demonstrating 
that for white individuals, stereotype threat, “the fear of being stereotyped as racially prejudiced,” 
can lead to racial distancing); Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the 
Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797, 
797, 808 (1995) (defining stereotype threat and finding that stereotype threat with regard to 
intelligence affects the behavior of African-Americans in intellectual situations). 
72. See Phillip Atiba Goff et al., Racism Leads to Pushups: How Racial Discrimination 
Threatens Subordinate Men’s Masculinity, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1111, 1115 
(2012) (finding that “[f]or Black participants [in a study], the experience of discrimination 
threatened their masculinity, which led them to engage in compensatory masculine behaviors”). 
73. PHILLIP ATIBA GOFF ET AL., CONSORTIUM FOR POLICE LEADERSHIP IN EQUITY, 
PROTECTING EQUITY: THE CONSORTIUM FOR POLICE LEADERSHIP IN EQUITY REPORT ON THE 
SAN JOSE POLICE DEPARTMENT 11 (2013); Goff et al., supra note 71, at 91.  
74. Steele & Aronson, supra note 71, at 797. 
75. See Goff et al., supra note 71, at 104 (positing that stereotype threat affects the interaction 
between white and black individuals by causing racial distancing); Jennifer A. Richeson & 
J. Nicole Shelton, Negotiating Interracial Interaction: Costs, Consequences, and Possibilities, 16 
CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 316, 317–19 (2007) (arguing that members of dominant 
groups engage in self-regulation—careful monitoring of thoughts and behaviors—in order to 
avoid appearing prejudiced, which can lead to negative intrapersonal outcomes). 
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In interactions between black and white strangers, for example, 
egalitarian-minded whites might fear that their words and actions will be 
assessed as racist.76  Meanwhile, black individuals might fear that they will 
be evaluated as criminal or unintelligent.77  Researchers have found that this 
anxiety can affect the verbal and nonverbal behaviors of both individuals,78 
leading them to physically distance themselves from each other, make less 
eye contact, and use unfriendly tones of voice.79  It is not difficult to 
imagine that the resulting interaction is negative for both individuals, 
confirming the negative stereotypes, either conscious or unconscious, that 
they had for each other. 
We can see the relevance of stereotype threat in the context of a job 
interview.  Imagine a white employer who interviews two equally qualified 
candidates who differ only in race.  The effects of stereotype threat on both 
the employer and the black candidate can adversely affect the dynamics of 
the interview.  As a result, the black applicant may be judged more 
negatively and therefore fail to obtain the job, not because of any explicit 
racist beliefs on the part of the decision maker but because stereotype threat 
adversely affected the interaction.80  In this situation, the black candidate 
has been disadvantaged by bias, but not the intentional bias that current 
antidiscrimination law recognizes.81  Furthermore, if it becomes apparent 
that this particular employer has historically hired equally qualified whites 
over blacks, others may ascribe his or her behavior to conscious racism 
even when this label is inaccurate. 
We can even imagine how stereotype threat might affect the 
interactions of individuals with multiracial couples.  An individual might 
want to ask an interracial couple about how they met simply because she is 
always curious about what brought two people together and not because she 
wants to interrogate the couple’s interraciality.  However, she may fear that 
this question, or some other question, might lead the couple to perceive her 
as having a problem with their relationship.  Thus, she becomes 
 
76. Goff et al., supra note 71, at 92. 
77. Cynthia J. Najdowski, Stereotype Threat in Criminal Interrogations: Why Innocent Black 
Suspects Are at Risk for Confessing Falsely, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 562, 564–65 (2011); 
Steele & Aronson, supra note 71, at 797. 
78. E.g., Dovidio et al., supra note 69, at 62. 
79. See Goff et al., supra note 71, at 91; see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, MEASURING 
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 95 (Rebecca M. Blank et al. eds., 2004) (discussing tone of voice); 
Dovidio et al., supra note 69, at 63 (discussing eye contact). 
80. For a general discussion of the effects of negative stereotypes on interview interactions, 
see Carl O. Word et al., The Nonverbal Mediation of Self-Fulfilling Prophecies in Interracial 
Interaction, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 109 (1974); and also see John F. Dovidio & 
Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism and Selection Decisions: 1989 and 1999, 11 PSYCHOL. SCI. 
315 (2000). 
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2006) (stating that it is illegal to discriminate on the basis 
of race in hiring). 
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uncomfortable, anxious, and self-conscious about everything she says, 
leading her to act in ways that might lead the couple to assume incorrectly 
that she is disturbed by the fact that they are an interracial couple.  Again, 
stereotype threat has led to attributions of racism when, in fact, no such 
bigotry existed. 
Similarly, stereotype threat may also be an additional reason for why 
interracial relationships, especially black–white interracial relationships, are 
rare.  A white man who is attracted to a black woman may be apprehensive 
about approaching her because of the fear that he will be evaluated 
negatively because of predominant racial stereotypes of white racism.  He 
may be concerned that the anxiety he feels about approaching someone to 
whom he is attracted will be mistakenly interpreted as arising out of racism.  
If he does engage her in conversation, she may attribute his anxious 
behaviors to bias rather than to jitters.  Thus, the resulting unpleasant 
interaction may prevent a relationship from occurring. 
In addition to stereotype threat, another psychological process that can 
cause racial disparities is implicit racial bias.82  Implicit racial bias is a 
pernicious result of the way that our brains process information.83  In order 
to make sense of all the information that bombards us, our brains 
automatically and unconsciously categorize people and objects with 
lightning speed.84  Once these people or objects are placed into categories, 
anything that is associated with that category also comes to mind.85  Again, 
this occurs unconsciously and automatically.86  Then, these unconscious 
associations can predispose us to evaluate the person or object in a manner 
consistent with the unconsciously activated associations.87 
 
82. See generally John F. Dovidio et al., supra note 69 (studying the effects of implicit bias 
on behavior during interactions between black and white individuals and finding that the implicit 
bias of white individuals predicted their nonverbal friendliness toward black individuals); 
Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The 
Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1464 (1998) (“Implicit 
attitudes are manifest as actions or judgments that are under the control of automatically activated 
evaluation, without the performer’s awareness of that causation.”). 
83. See sources cited supra note 82. 
84. See SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 71 (2d ed. 1991) 
(discussing the “categorization” stage of information management and suggesting that the 
categorization of a particular action occurs spontaneously and rapidly). 
85. See id. at 69 (discussing how fundamental attribution error occurs when one attributes 
behavior of another person to his or her own dispositional qualities, rather than to situational 
forces). 
86. See id. at 67–69 (suggesting that fundamental attribution error is automatic and 
unconscious). 
87. See Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled 
Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 5 (1989) (discussing a model whereby 
“stereotypes are automatically (or heuristically) applied to members of the stereotyped group” 
even without a conscious element). 
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For instance, research over the past four decades demonstrates that, 
regardless of our race and our consciously held beliefs, most of us 
unconsciously associate young black men with criminality.88  We are 
socialized to have this association because of what we read in the 
newspapers, hear on the radio, or see on television.89  As a result, in 
contexts where this association is relevant, we will interpret ambiguous 
behaviors of black men more negatively, and as more consistent with 
criminality, than ambiguous behaviors of young white men in identical 
situations.90  Unconscious racial bias, then, refers to how our unconscious 
stereotypes and attitudes can affect our behaviors and judgments in ways 
that we are unaware of and thus cannot control. 
In her book, Onwuachi-Willig reveals how unconscious racial bias can 
influence our dating preferences.91  She references a study by Professor 
Goff, one of this Review’s authors, in which black women were rated as 
more masculine than their white counterparts.92  As a result, black women 
were literally miscategorized as black men between 9% and 13% of the 
time (depending on stimulus modality, e.g., videos versus pictures).93  
Additionally, and unsurprisingly, the more masculine a woman was rated, 
the less attractive she was rated, regardless of race, leading to racial 
differences in ratings of attractiveness.94  Importantly, when black women 
were not perceived as black, these effects virtually disappeared, suggesting 
that it is the coding of “blackness” that masculinizes black women.95 
Furthermore, unconscious biases can also explain the association 
between family and monoraciality that Onwuachi-Willig uncovers in her 
book.  As she writes, “Strangers often try to fit such couples into 
comfortable tropes of blackness and whiteness.”96  This observation is 
consistent with lessons from social psychology.  We have been socialized 
 
88. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, 
Essay, Self-Defense and the Suspicion Heuristic, 98 IOWA L. REV. 293, 303–04, 306–07, 310–14 
(2012). 
89. See Phillip Atiba Goff et al., Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical 
Dehumanization, and Contemporary Consequences, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 292, 
303–05 (2008). 
90. See Richardson & Goff, supra note 88, at 303–07, 310–14 (referring to numerous studies 
that reveal an implicit association between young black men and criminality and discussing that 
association’s effect on the way people perceive seemingly benign behaviors); see also L. Song 
Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2045–48 
(2011) (recounting a study that demonstrated that the race of the actors dramatically influenced 
how observers interpreted the actors’ actions). 
91. ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 3, at 128–29. 
92. Id. at 146 (citing Phillip Atiba Goff et al., “Ain’t I a Woman?”: Towards an Intersectional 
Approach to Person Perception and Group-Based Harms, 59 SEX ROLES 392, 392 (2008)). 
93. Goff et al., supra note 92, at 397 fig.2, 400 fig.4, 401. 
94. Id. at 397–98. 
95. See id. at 401. 
96. ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 3, at 175. 
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through television shows and other sources to view families as monoracial.  
When multiracial families are depicted, their non-normativity is 
highlighted, thereby reinforcing the monoracial norm.97  Thus, our 
unconscious association of family with monoraciality prevents us from 
categorizing multiracial individuals as families in our minds. 
The effects of unconscious racial bias and stereotype threat can cause 
problematic racial disparities in employment, housing, and a host of other 
legally relevant domains.  Yet, antidiscrimination law fails to provide a 
remedy.98  The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause provides 
that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”99  While the language of the Amendment is broad 
enough to cover both conscious bigotry and unconscious racial bias, the 
Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence requires plaintiffs to prove 
that “a discriminatory purpose [was] a motivating factor” in the challenged 
conduct.100  And discriminatory purpose means that “the decisionmaker . . . 
selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because 
of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable 
group.”101  While scholars have argued that the intent standard is broad 
enough to cover unconscious biases,102 thus far, the Supreme Court has not 
adopted this interpretation.103 
Acknowledgment of racially disparate impacts might provide a remedy 
for the effects of unconscious biases and stereotype threat because these 
psychological processes result in racially disparate impacts.  The Court has 
held that claims based upon disparate impacts must be brought under the 
civil rights statutes rather than under the Equal Protection Clause.104  
However, while antidiscrimination statutes purport to recognize claims of 
 
97. Consider the recent reaction to a Cheerios commercial that depicted an interracial 
family—a black father, white mother, and biracial child.  The reaction to the ad was so negative 
that Cheerios asked that the comments section on YouTube be turned off.  Leanne Italie, Cheerios 
Exec on Ad Featuring Mixed Race Couple: ‘We Were Reflecting an American Family,’ 
HUFFINGTON POST (June 5, 2013, 5:14 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/05/ 
cheerios-ad-mixed-race-couple_n_3390520.html.  A Cheerios executive defended the commercial, 
stating that they “were reflecting an American family.”  Id. 
98. See supra notes 26–32 and accompanying text. 
99. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
100. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977). 
101. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 
102. See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 59, at 1243 (describing the need for coherence in 
distinguishing between intentional and unintentional forms of discrimination and arguing in favor 
of a tiered system of liability predicated on this distinction); White & Krieger, supra note 61, at 
506Ȃ11 (arguing that some Supreme Court opinions support the idea that intent can be 
unconscious). 
103. Harris, supra note 58, at 2011 (“Perhaps more disturbingly, the criminal intent rule 
insulates from judicial scrutiny forms of bias that are unconscious or cognitive in origin.”). 
104. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248–52 (1976). 
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discrimination based upon disparate racial impacts,105 courts still require 
plaintiffs to demonstrate some malicious intent.106 
As the previous discussion demonstrates, while the Equal Protection 
Clause and the civil rights statutes were meant to provide remedies for 
discrimination, they fail because each is based upon a model of 
discrimination that, as shown by the science, is no longer prevalent.107  
Thus, just as the law embeds normative conceptions of family, the law also 
embeds norms of how discrimination operates.  This construction not only 
reflects societal beliefs about what discrimination looks like but also 
legitimates them.  This means that, barring significant challenges to the 
present conceptualization of race, racism, and how they function, both the 
law and society will fail to interrogate how universally human mental 
processes can provoke racial injustice even in the absence of conscious bias.  
This is why a new model of racism, broader conceptualizations of how it 
functions, and more inclusive understandings of protected classes are 
critical to making continued progress on racial equity—something that the 
MSJ model advances and Onwuachi-Willig’s book pushes us to do. 
Conclusion 
Professor Onwuachi-Willig’s compelling analysis reveals the 
importance of considering how the law’s embedded assumptions can stymie 
progress towards racial equality.  In the domain of interracial relationships, 
her proposal to add multiracial families as a protected category to 
antidiscrimination statutes is both well-supported and necessary in order to 
protect these families from discrimination and to broaden societal 
conceptions of family.  Furthermore, her insights also open up space to 
consider more broadly how the law’s and society’s conceptions of 
discrimination also create harm.  Consequently, not only should the law 
expand to provide protection to categories of individuals previously 
excluded, as Onwuachi-Willig rightly suggests, but the law should also 
 
105. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a), (k) (2006). 
106. Harris, supra note 58, at 2010 (“Even where evidence of ‘disparate impact’ can establish 
a prima facie case, the courts have emphasized the plaintiff’s ultimate burden of proving invidious 
intent.”).  Furthermore, claims based upon disparate impact are rare because “very few Title VII 
cases are actually amenable to disparate impact treatment.”  Krieger, supra note 59, at 1162 n.3 
(noting that it is a “common misperception . . . that a plaintiff can prevail in virtually any type of 
case by making an unrebutted showing of disparate impact on a group protected by Title VII”); 
see also Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After Affirmative 
Action, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1251, 1302–03 (1998) (“Claims of disparate impact[] . . . constituted 
less than two percent of the courts’ Title VII caseload . . . .”).  In fact, since 1971, the Supreme 
Court “has yet to find disparate impact discrimination, and lower federal courts have not had 
much better success.”  Foster, supra note 59. 
107. See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 106, at 1304 (arguing that “from a social and cognitive 
psychological perspective, . . . reliance on the individual disparate treatment adjudications will 
result in the significant underidentification of discrimination, not only by decision makers, . . . but 
by victims and fact finders as well”). 
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safeguard these protected categories from the harms that arise from 
unintentional biases.  Put another way, her insights require an expansion of 
antidiscrimination law to include protections against these seemingly 
“nonbiased” sources of pervasive intergroup discrimination as well. 
Finally, Onwuachi-Willig’s proposal has an additional benefit.  As 
previously discussed, unconscious stereotypes and attitudes can affect the 
behaviors and judgments of even the most egalitarian individuals.  
However, despite their ubiquity, these unconscious biases are also 
malleable.  In other words, it is possible to overcome their effects.  Lessons 
from the mind sciences demonstrate that one effective way to overcome the 
effects of unconscious biases is to make people aware of their existence and 
the possibility for overcoming them.108  As Onwuachi-Willig notes 
throughout her book, people likely harbor unconscious biases against 
multiracial families.  Thus, the addition of interraciality as a protected 
category to antidiscrimination statutes will help highlight to individuals the 
ways in which their unconscious biases may disadvantage multiracial 
families.  Such awareness can help people overcome their automatic and 
unconscious association of family with monoracial individuals and thereby 
serve to mitigate some of the harms currently affecting multiracial families 
that Onwuachi-Willig emphasizes in her pioneering book. 
 
108. For a discussion of these studies, see Richardson, supra note 90, at 2088Ȃ91, and 
L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Essay, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender Triage, 
122 YALE L.J. 2626, 2644–46 (2013). 
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